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Not only do Africa’s fragile states grow more slowly 
than non-fragile states, but they seem to be caught in a 
“fragility trap”. For instance, the probability that a fragile 
state in 2001 was still fragile in 2009 was 0.95. This 
paper presents an economic model where three features—
political instability and violence, insecure property rights 
and unenforceable contracts, and corruption—conspire 
to create a slow-growth-poor-governance equilibrium trap 
into which these fragile states can fall. The analysis shows 
that, by addressing the three problems, fragile countries 
can emerge from the fragility trap and enjoy a level of 
sustained economic growth. But addressing these issues 
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requires resources, which are scarce because external aid is 
often tailored to the country’s performance and cut back 
when there is instability, insecurity, and corruption. The 
implication is that, even if aid is seemingly unproductive 
in these weak-governance environments, it could be 
hugely beneficial if it is invested in such a way that it 
helps these countries tackle the root causes of instability, 
insecurity, and corruption. Empirical estimations 
corroborate the postulated relationships of the model, 
supporting the notion that it is possible for African fragile 
countries to avoid the fragility trap.Avoiding the Fragility Trap in Africa 
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Twenty-two of Sub-Saharan Africa￿ s 48 countries are classi￿ed by the World Bank as ￿fragile
and con￿ ict-a⁄ected states￿ , countries where policies and institutions￿ or governance, broadly
de￿ned￿ are so weak that the state￿ s ability to guarantee security to its citizens and deliver basic
public services is severely limited.1 More disturbing than the large number of these states is
the fact that, since the late 1990s, their performance has been lagging behind that of non-fragile
states, with the gap widening over time (Figure 1). Furthermore, fragility seems to be persistent:
the probability that an African fragile state in 2001 remained fragile in 2009 was 0.95. Globally
speaking, 35 countries de￿ned by the World Bank as fragile in 1979 were still fragile in 2009
(European Report on Development, 2009).
In this paper, we build on these observations to show that, because of their weak policies and
institutions, some of these countries could be caught in a low-growth-poor-governance equilibrium
trap, while others risk falling into the trap with a small shortfall in resources. We develop an
analytical model where weak governance is re￿ ected in three economic features: (i) instability
and violence destroy part of the country￿ s capital stock; (ii) insecurity of property rights and
unenforceable contracts undermine the productivity of labor; and (iii) corruption and other
forms of capture limit government tax revenues. These features, combined with a minimum level
of consumption below which people would starve, result in an economy that can collapse or is
at risk of collapsing into a low-investment, slow-growth equilibrium. If however the economy has
access to su¢ cient resources that can be spent on addressing the three problems mentioned above,
it will emerge from the trap￿ or avoid falling into one￿ and enjoy sustained growth. Empirical
estimates corroborate the main relationships of the model. In particular, we ￿nd that aid to
fragile states is more productive than aid in general. In short, this fragility trap is not just a
theoretical construct but could be a feature of the real world.
The results of this paper have important implications for aid policy towards fragile states.
For the same features that contribute to the existence of fragility trap￿ instability, insecurity of
contracts and corruption￿ also lead donors to cut back aid to these countries, fearing that it will
be ￿wasted.￿The analysis in this paper shows that, if the aid can be channeled to addressing
these problems of the economy, it could help these countries avoid the fragility trap, in which
case the external resources would have been extremely productive.
1The technical criterion is that the state￿ s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, the World Bank￿ s rating
of policies and institutions in 16 areas, has an overall score of 3.2 or below on a scale of 1-6 (World Bank, 2002).
1The plan of the paper is as follows: for the rest of this introduction, we brie￿ y survey the
economic literature that motivated our model. In section 2, we present the analytical model and
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Figure 1: Median per capita GDP (1997-2010)
Each of the three features of our model￿ political instability and violence, insecure property
rights and unenforceable contracts, and corruption￿ has been analyzed in previous papers. How-
ever, we are not aware of any formal model that combines all three features. For instance, there
is a large literature on the e⁄ects of political instability and violence on economic development
(Barro, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996; Zack, 2000),
and on private investment (Svensson, 1999; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Campos and Nugent,
2002). Likewise, Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Benhabib et al. (2001) have
emphasized the role of public goods (including property rights) in economic growth, while Macit
(2011) focuses directly on institutions such as employment protection legislation in driving labor
productivity growth. And Feng, Kugler and Zak (2000), among others, have emphasized how a
falling tax base (often due to high levels of corruption) undermines government￿ s ability to im-
plement policies of any type, including some of the basic functions of the state, such as security
2(USAID, 2005).
This paper also builds upon a large literature on poverty traps in general, and fragility traps
in particular. The theoretical foundations of such traps were laid out by Azariadis (1997), and
Lopez and Serven (2009) provide some recent empirical tests. Stewart and Brown (2009) portray
fragile countries as countries characterized by dysfunctional institutions and con￿ ict situations.
Sachs (2007) introduced the idea that, because some developing countries are caught in a poverty
trap, they will need signi￿cant amounts of aid to emerge. Collier (2007) broadened the concept
to include the ￿con￿ ict trap￿ , a notion that Zoellick (2008) linked back to the original poverty
trap in a way that comes closer to what we develop here.
Finally, the idea that the widely-used performance-based allocation (PBA) method for aid
may not be appropriate for fragile states has been raised by Guillaumont et al. (2010), who argue
that ￿vulnerability￿ should be a criterion. Barungi and Davies (2010) suggest that the PBA
formula does not take into account the special features of fragile states. For example, a 2005
study by the World Bank concluded that fragile states ￿received 40 percent less aid than their
policy and institutional performance and poverty would predict.￿
2 The basic structure of the model
This paper presents a formal equilibrium model in which political instability, insecure property
rights, and corruption interact with minimum level of consumption to explain why Africa￿ s fragile
states are caught in a low-level equilibrium trap. We start with a general equilibrium model in
which three types of agents interact, namely: households, ￿rms and the government. Population
is exogenous, and development, which is endogenously determined, depends on institutional and
political factors, and government policies. We consider an economy with a large number of
individuals who live three periods in overlapping generations. At each point in time, children,
young adults and older adults are alive. For simplicity we posit individuals within a generation
(t) to be identical: In each period (t) the economy produces a single good that can be used for
consumption or investment in physical capital, Kt:
Agents maximize lifetime utility during the two periods of adulthood, subject to a budget
constraint in each period: During young adulthood, individuals work for ￿rms, pay a proportion
of their labor income ￿t 2 (0;1) to the government as taxes, and use the remaining income to
fund their own and their children￿ s consumption, and savings for retirement. Households do not
work during their retirement and consume the principal and interest on their savings. In addition
3to choosing consumption in young adulthood therefore, households choose their consumption in
old age. Output is produced with a Cobb Douglas technology in which both institutional factors
and political instability are accounted for.
Every government has at its goal political stability, economic growth, and the provision of
basic services to its citizens (McGuire and Olson, 1996). We refer to economic growth as a
natural goal because it helps raise individuals￿income while sustaining government by increasing
tax revenues and its ability to implement new policies. Policies are chosen to contribute directly
to production and to raise government resources. We de￿ne and refer to political instability,
￿t; as the proportion of an economy￿ s physical capital destroyed in violence or civil wars. While
political instability is endogenous, we do not model the incentives for instability.2
2.1 Preferences
All agents have identical logarithmic and temporally separable preferences. Agents maximize
lifetime utility. The utility maximization problem for an individual born at (t￿1) can be written
as follows:
Max[ct; ct+1] ln(ct ￿ c) + ￿ lnct+1 (2.1.1)
s:t:
st = wt(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ ct
ct+1 = Rt+1st
ct > c; ct+1 > 0;
(2.1.2)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes preferences for consuming when middle-aged versus old-aged, ct is ￿rst-
period consumption, and c re￿ ects a minimum consumption requirement in the ￿rst period; ct+1
indicates consumption in the second period.
The ￿rst equation in (2.1.2) is the budget constraint in youth; it equates savings, st; to after-
tax labor income wt(1 ￿ ￿t); after ct have been spent for ￿rst period consumption. The second
equation in (2.1.2) is the budget constraint faced by a retiree; it shows that old-age consumption,
ct+1; is funded by savings from the young adult, plus any accrued interests, Rt+1st: Individuals
take political instability and violence, ￿t; insecure property rights and unenforceable contracts; Gt;
and the tax rate, ￿t; as given in dealing with the maximization problem in (2.1.1-2.1.2).
Combing 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we write down the following unconstrained maximization:
Max ct ln(ct ￿ c) + ￿ lnRt+1 [wt(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ ct]:
2See Easterly and levine (1997) for recent discussions on political instability.
4For a su¢ ciently large value of labor income, i.e., It > c; and as a result of log preferences,
the model in (2.1.1-2.1.2) produces a unique and strictly positive solution for both ￿rst-period
consumption and savings, c￿
t and s￿
t; respectively. However, for a low level of labor income, i.e.,
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;
where wt(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ It is net income. For simplicity￿ s sake we assume that the tax rate, ￿t; is
determined by the government and depends on its ability to control corruption (see Besley and
Persson, 2009; Acemoglu, 2005, for similar formulations where the government places an equilib-
rium constraint on taxation). However, due to corruption, taxpayers are forced to pay more than
the required tax rate and the real ￿scal revenue from taxes and other ￿nes are correspondingly
lower.
Equation (2.1.3) shows that an individual￿ s optimal ￿rst-period consumption is positively
related to after-tax labor income wt(1￿￿t); negatively related to the tax rate, ￿t; and positively
related to the minimum subsistence consumption, c:
Equation (2.1.4) shows that optimal savings is a constant proportion of after-tax labor income,
with this proportion increasing with the preference for old age consumption. Savings decrease with
the tax rate. Further, as in Galor and Moav (2004), this saving function captures the Kaldorian-
Keynesian saving behavior, i.e., the marginal propensity to save is an increasing function of
wealth.3
2.2 Production technology and fragility
As discussed earlier, political instability ￿t 2 [0;1] is the proportion of physical capital stock
that is destroyed during political con￿ icts, violence or war. If ￿t = 1; instability or violence is
so high that the entire physical stock is destroyed, the state is not able to collect tax revenue
3Galor and Moav (2004) assert that long-run inequality, and hence poverty traps, could emerge because of
di⁄erences in income.
5and it fails (fragile state).4 Firms produce output, Yt; with a modi￿ed constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function that takes into account the e⁄ects of instability and insecure
property rights. In aggregate we derive the following production technology,
(2.2.1) Yt = (Kt (1 ￿ ￿t))
￿ [GtLt]
1￿￿ ;
where ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the marginal productivity parameter (capital share); Gt denotes the
level of institutions (e.g., the degree of law and contract enforcement among private citizens) at
time t. Gt is known at time t and depends on investment made by government at time t ￿ 1,
i:e:; ￿G;t￿1, suggesting that a certain degree of state investment in political stability and absence
of violence is necessary for private citizens to function productively. Improvement in Gt helps
increase production (see Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Benhabib et al., 2001 for
formulations of the role of public goods in economic growth). Lt is the number of working people;
it grows at a constant rate n.
Equation (2.2.1) indicates that absence of stability in the form of civil wars a⁄ects production
by reducing the stock of productive capital. Arguments in this area assert that lack of security
imposes negative shocks on the economy and raises security costs and ine¢ ciencies of physical
capital. High costs on security, in turn, lead to misallocation of resources toward lower productive
activities.5
Assuming perfect competition, a representative ￿rm chooses physical capital per unit of labor,
kt ￿ Kt=Lt to maximize its pro￿ts, that is
(2.2.2) Max kt (yt ￿ rtkt);
where rt is the interest rate (or cost of ￿nancing capital investment), and yt ￿ Yt=Lt is the output
per e⁄ective unit of labor. Substituting (2.2.1) in (2.2.2) and solving the above maximization
problem produces the ￿rm￿ s demand functions for capital and labor.
Given these demand schedules made by ￿rms and supply decisions made by consumers, the
market clearing conditions in terms of wage (wt) and return to savings (Rt ￿ 1 + rt ￿ ￿) are
4Absence of state authority in fragile countries create opportunities for rent-seekers to engage in violent activities
such as criminality, con￿ ict and terrorism. The resulting political environment makes lawful investment extremely
risky, hence reduces productive capacities of the economy and shrinks government income.
5Another category of costs relates to increased uncertainty and its impact on consumer and investor￿ s behavior.
Increased uncertainty usually increases market volatility, thereby boosting risk premiums. This a⁄ects producers￿
and consumers￿behaviors; it induces investors, for example, to move out of riskier assets (such as stocks) toward
safer, more liquid, and shorter-term assets (such as cash). It, hence, adversely impacts commitments for long-term
investments and purchases and increases demand for short-term liquidity, which, in turn, works to lower spending.
6found. ￿ 2 [0;1] is the rate of depreciation of physical capital. We assume complete depreciation,
i.e., ￿ = 1.
Following (2.2.1) and (2.2.2), factor prices wt and rt are marginal products of labor and
capital, respectively; they are given as follows:




(2.2.4) rt = ￿(Kt (1 ￿ ￿t))
￿￿1 (GtLt)
1￿￿ :
Note that (@wt=@￿t) < 0;@Rt=@￿t > 0; ((@wt=@Gt);@Rt=@Gt) > 0: Political instability reduces
the equilibrium wage; it increases the cost of ￿nancing capital investment. Improvement in Gt;
however, raises both the wage and return to savings. Likewise, the enforcement of property rights
provides great incentives for production as it raises both wage and interest rate.
















if kt > kL
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿t)(kt (1 ￿ ￿t))
￿ G1￿￿
t if kt 6 kL
;
with @c￿
t=@￿t < 0; @c￿
t=@Gt > 0; and @c￿
t=@￿t < 0; for all kt > 0: Following (2.2.5), ￿rst-period
consumption (ct) depends negatively on ￿t & ￿t, and positively on Gt. Likewise, the optimal level













if kt > kL
0 if kt 6 kL
;
with @s￿
t=@￿t < 0; @s￿
t=@Gt > 0; and @s￿
t=@￿t < 0; for kt > kL:6 As for equation (2.2.5), the
savings function is negatively related to both ￿t and ￿t. Campos and Nugent (2003) argue that
political instability can delay investment, destroy the existing capital stock, resulting in harmful
political uncertainty. In this case, political instability may harm an individual￿ s prospects towards
savings by destroying the stock of existing capital on which both wages and savings are based.
Following equation (2.2.6) and the fact that aggregate stock of physical capital is given by the








: Details on how this condition was derived will be given later.
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;
where (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




= (1￿￿)yt = wt; kt is physical capital per labor and kL is the
threshold level of capital per labor below which the economy falls into a fragility trap. Equation
(2.2.7) is a standard stock accounting relationship for capital accumulation; it is represented in
Figure 2. It de￿nes the long-run steady state as a function of factors such as political instability








Figure 2: A time path of an economy with two equilibria
This equation indicates that for a low level stock of physical capital, kt ￿ kL; the economy
converges to a poverty trap. As in Collier (2007), the economy described above will be caught
in one or more of the following traps: the political instability and con￿ ict trap, the insecurity of
property rights trap, and the corruption trap. When all three factors co-exist, the economy is
caught in a vicious circle, referred to as the ￿fragility trap￿in this model (see also Zoellick, 2008).
From equation (2:2:7) we ￿rst derive the condition for fragility traps to occur, and then we
discuss the transitional dynamic path of the above mentioned economy. For given values of ￿t; ￿t
8and Gt, the economy is at risk of falling into a fragility trap when the stock of physical capital









where kL is inversely related to Gt and positively related to ￿t and ￿t: There are two nontrivial
stationary equilibria for this economy. Given ￿t; ￿t and Gt; and k0 ￿ kL; the economy is simply
trapped in the lower equilibrium. If however k0 > kL; then the economy will converge to a
balanced growth path:
2.3 Government problem and fragility
Government￿ s stability and viability depend on its ability to collect resources from the working
population. These resources are needed to fund government programs, to build institutions and to
provide basic services to citizens. Hence, a government that is unable to collect tax revenues will
not be able to assure stability, promote growth, build strong and e¢ cient institutions, and provide
basic services needed by its citizens. Building an e¢ cient infrastructure to collect tax resources
and to combat tax expropriation becomes a key priority for the government. In the absence of tax
enforcement provisions, sel￿sh government o¢ cials will extract a rent from government resources,
also know as tax leakage. Tax leakage by causing a revenu drain may adversely a⁄ect the ￿scal
sustainability of the state￿ s economy.
The total taxes paid is equal to a fraction ￿t of wages paid to the Lt working individuals, i.e;
(2.3.1) ￿twtLt;
where wtLt = (1￿￿)Y t is the ￿xed proportion of output paid in form of aggregate wage to labor.
Of these taxes paid, a fraction dt 2 (0;￿t) evaporates through tax leakage or corruption, and
only ￿t is received by the government.7 In addition, the government receives Zt ￿ 0 in the form
of foreign aid: In sum, the government receives for its activities and programs, including those
aimed at assuring peace and stability, the following amount of resources:
￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t + Zt:
where, as noted earlier, Zt is the amount of foreign aid received by a given country at time t. The
traditional view of foreign aid is that it provides macroeconomic opportunities and bene￿ts that
7dt could parametrize the extent to which a government is unable to collect tax revenues, maybe because of tax
evasion and/or informal and underground practices in most fragile states. dt can be also thought of as parametrizing
the absence of tax authority and infrastructure to combat tax evasion and income tax expropriation.
9might result in positive multipliers e⁄ects. Most notably it boosts investment, and stimulates
economic growth. In this paper, the focus is that foreign aid should not be used simply to
temporarily respond to shocks and ￿ll gaps; it should be used for investment in state capacity, i.e.,
promoting political stability, ensuring secure property rights, policing corruption, and building
￿scal capacities. Arguments relating to aid e⁄ectiveness in fragile states indicate that a strategic
approach should encompass a range of policy options such as political stability, rule of law,
and regional programs (Radelet, 2004). In this regard, foreign aid can serve not only to promote
stability and security, but it can increase production by shifting the production possibility frontier
outward.
As a rule of thumb for resource management in fragile states, the government budget must
balance in each period t. That is, spending must equal total income, that is:
(2.3.2) ￿dt + ￿Gt + ￿￿t = ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t + Zt;
where ￿Gt is government spending on building secure property rights, ￿￿t is government spend-
ing on ensuring stability and absence of violence, and ￿dt is government spending on policing
corruption. We asume that political instability and violence, institutional quality (i. e., secure
property rights), and the rate of tax leakage are respectively given by ￿t; Gt; and dt such that
￿t = f(￿￿t); f0(￿￿t) < 0; Gt = f(￿Gt); f0(￿Gt) > 0; and dt = f(￿dt); f0(￿dt) < 0:8 We further
impose restrictions on government policies, i:e:; (￿dt; ￿Gt; ￿￿t) > 0:9
In many cases, consumers evaluate governments and their policies solely on output growth
(Logan, 1986; Oates, 1988). Hence, policy makers have incentives to invest in growth enhancing
institutions such as stability and absence of violence, secure property rights and enforceable
contracts, and absence of corruption. Given all the bene￿ts from growth, the primary goal of any
government should be to maximize aggregate income growth.10
In this model, a government policy is de￿ned as a triplet P = f￿Gt; ￿￿t; ￿dtg; which is a set
of government expenditures on political stability , secure property rights, and anti-corruption;
all of which are funded by a lump-sum tax on wage income, ￿t; and external aid, Zt ￿ 0. The
8￿￿t raises growth by preventing the destruction of productive capital; ￿Gt raises labor productivity growth,
which in turn, raises output and consumption. In case of ￿scal capacity, this investment can be tought of as
developing a tax authority, its compliance structures and infrastructure to enforce an income tax. Speci￿cally, ￿dt
is expected to raise the potential ability of the governments to raise revenue.
9These restrictions follow from the functional form of the government￿ s objective function.
10There is extensive empirical evidence showing that politiciens are more likely to be re-elected when the economy
is growing. For example, Lewis-Beck (1990, p. 157) argues that economic issues are the most important factors
a⁄ecting choices in elections. Fiorina (1981) indicates that politiciens set policies presuming that voters care about
the health of the economy.
10government￿ s optimization problem at time t can now be formulated as:(11)(12)








(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿t+1)
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Zt + ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t = ￿dt + ￿Gt + ￿￿t (2.3.5)
￿t+1 = 1 ￿ ’￿￿
￿;t; (2.3.6)
Gt+1 = ￿G;t, (2.3.7)
dt+1 = ￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿dt; (2.3.8)
11Following Ghate et al. (2002), maximizing aggregate income growth is equivalent to maximizing capital deepen-
ing or investment rate. This formulation does not require government to know consumers￿utility functions; instead
it needs only obesrve the state of the economy, Kt; when making policy choices at time t (see also Lindblom, 1993
for details).
12Alternatively, the government could have maximized the welfare function as follows:
Maxf￿Gt; ￿dt; ￿￿tgW = ln(ct ￿ c) + ￿ lnct+1
s:t:
￿dt + ￿Gt + ￿￿t = ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t + Zt
To be able to obtain explicit solutions from the above maximization, we need to assume that the interest rate is
exogenous, so that ct+1 = Rt+1st ￿ Rst: However, in this model of fragile states, endogenous interest rate has some
bene￿t in its own. To avoid complications that might arise with endogenous interest rate, we rede￿ne the welfare
function and assume that in each period t, that can be considered as an election cycle, policy makers choose their
spendings to combat corruption, promote secure property rights, and ensure political stability so as to maximize
the current consumption of both young adults and old people. Therefore they de￿ne the welfare function over
consumption by young adults in period t, c
y
t; and consumption by old people in period t, c
o
t: With this in mind,
we set the government maximization problem as follows:
Maxf￿Gt; ￿dt; ￿￿tgW = ln(c
y




government budget constraint given in (2.3.2)
Using equations (2.1.3) and (2.1.4), we simplify the above maximization to:




￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)ln
1
1 + ￿
+ ￿(ln￿ + lnn);
and n is the exogenous rate of population growth. Solving the problem stated above yields exactly the same
solutions as solving the problem stated in equations (2.3.3)-(2.3.7).
11where ￿ 2 (0;1); and ￿t+1 is the exogenous maximum rate of tax leakage.13 The government
chooses policies to maximize aggregate growth income at time t; subject to ￿ve constraints.
The resource constraint (equation 2.3.5) equates tax revenue, ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t; plus foreign aid, Zt;
to government expenditures on policies ￿￿t; ￿Gt; and ￿dt. Equation (2.3.7) implies also full
depreciation of Gt for the sake of tractability. Plugging equations (2.3.4), (2.3.5), (2.3.6), (2.3.7)
and (2.3.8) into (2.3.3) yields the following Lagrangian maximization problem, where q is the
Lagrangian multiplier:

















Zt + ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t ￿ ￿d;t ￿ ￿G;t ￿ ￿￿;t
￿
Taking the derivative with respect to ￿d;t; ￿￿;t; ￿G;t & q; respectively, yields the ￿rst order



































Zt + ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t ￿ ￿d;t ￿ ￿G;t ￿ ￿￿;t = 0 (2.3.13)
These ￿rst order conditions con￿rm standard intuitions. Equations (2.3.10) to (2.3.12) govern the
decisions of government investment in policies. They all equate the left hand side marginal bene￿t
of investing in a given policy to the utility cost of doing so or the shadow price, q. Notice that in
each equation (2.3.10-2.3.12) this cost is constant and equals q; whereas the bene￿ts are variable
and depend on each policy elasticity of output, government spending on policing corruption,
￿d;t; and on ￿t+1: Further, in all three equations, marginal bene￿ts are increasing in the degree of
tax enforcement, v. Plugging equation (2.3.12) into (2.3.11) and (2.3.10) implies that the ratio of
government investment in property rights and contracts enforcement to investment in peace and
stability is constant as the economy grows, and equals to the ratio of marginal products of the








13The function d used here refers to an expropriation when relating to consumers and a tax leakage when relating
to government. It a⁄ects both consumer and government in the sense that the ￿rst ends up pays more in terms of
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Using equation (2.3.13) in combination with (2.3.14) and (2.3.16) yields the explicit optimal
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And since ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 + dt+1 = ￿t+1 + ￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿dt = 2￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿dt;
(2.3.20) ￿￿
t+1 =
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿t+1) ￿ v
￿
Zt + ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t
￿
(2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
Note ￿rst that the structure of equations (2.3.17) and (2.3.18) is quite similar. The only dif-
ference is that each expression is multiplied by the exponent of the corresponding investment
policy. The numerator in both (2.3.17) and (2.3.18) is the potential government revenue, which
includes revenue from tax, revenue from foreign aid, and the fraction of each dollar income saved.
The common denominator is the sum of all policy shares; it re￿ ects the cost of increasing gov-
ernment investment policies. Each of these policy variables depends on the tax base (or any of
its components), ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)Y t, the degree of tax enforcement, ￿; and the share of government
resources allocated to political stability, ￿. Notice, also, that an increase in the degree of tax
enforcement, v; has a negative e⁄ect on both ￿￿
￿;t and ￿￿
G;t: However, an increase in the share of
resources allocated to political stability, ￿; yields an increase in ￿￿
￿;t and a decrease in ￿￿
G;t :
13Unlike the two ￿rst government policy functions above, equations (2.3.19) and (2.3.20) display
di⁄erent structures. The numerator in (2.3.19) is the total amount of government revenues minus
the cost of government policies, whereas the numerator in (2.3.20) is the cost of government
policies minus the degree of tax enforcement weighted by total government revenue. Thus, an
increase in the degree of tax enforcement, v, is associated with a high increase in resources for
policing corruption, and leads to a decrease in optimal tax rate, ￿￿
t+1: In addition, an increase in
the share of government resources allocated to political stability, ￿; is associated with an increase
in ￿￿
d;t; suggesting some degree of complementarity between government policies as regards to
political stability and anti-corruption measures. As noted earlier, promoting political stability
and absence of violence demands resources; thus, an increase in ￿ is associated with high levels
of government investment in political stability, and requires continued increases in optimal tax
rate ￿￿
t+1:




to the level of tax base, Y t, and the level of foreign aid, Zt: In particular, @￿￿
￿;t=@Zt > 0;
@￿￿
G;t=@Zt > 0; and @￿￿
d;t=@Zt > 0: However, as we look at equation (2.3.20); we note that the
optimal tax rate is negatively related to Y t and Zt: Henceforth, this model predicts that better
tax codes that contain provisions for tax enforcement are associated with lower optimal tax rates
and, in turn, would stimulate production and growth. Furthermore, the fact that @￿￿
t+1=@Zt <
0 suggests that tax income and foreign aid can be regarded as substitute policy instruments.
Consequently, increases in foreign aid can allow poor states to sustain lower tax rates, and could
exert positive shocks on income growth through the promotion of physical capital accumulation.
Following equation (2.3.4), the dynamic equation with optimal government policy when ex-
ternal aid is zero is displayed in Figure 3 . For any k0 ￿ kL the economy will converge to zero;
and for any k0 > kL the economy will converge to kH: kL is de￿ned as below and provides an
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where Zt = 0, and Y t is the tax base known at time t: Condition (2.3.21) describes the fragility
environment when Zt = 0: It indicates that the ￿fragility trap￿depends on the degree of tax en-
forcement, ￿, the share of government resources allocated to political stability, ￿; the productivity
14of resources allocated to assuring political stability, ’; and the level of tax base, Y t. Increases
in tax base relax the fragility constraint and reduce the risks of falling into fragility traps for a
given country. Likewise, increases in the degree of tax enforcement, v, leads to same conclusions
as above. However, increases in the cost of government policies, (2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)), are associated







Figure 3: Time path of an economy when ￿0s are optimal & (Zt = 0)
As noted before, foreign aid can be very helpful for weak governments, provided that it is
invested to tackle the root causes of instability, insecurity and corruption. Below we present a
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Figure (4) above and equation (2.3.23) indicate that external aid can reduce the chance that
a country falls into a ￿fragility trap￿or increase the chance that a country reaches sustained,
balanced economic growth. Building on the insights from (??), it is appropriate to think that,
conditional on the fundamentals of each economy, there should exist a level of Zt, say Z
￿
t, such
that fragile economies can rise from a lower level equilibrium de￿ned by the dynamic equation





t is more than simply a ￿big push￿ ; it combines the idea of big push with an
optimal allocation strategy that tackles the root causes of instability, insecurity, and corruption.
Figure 5 below summarizes and displays geometrically the impact of Z
￿
t on the growth path









Figure 5: Time path of economy with optimal Zt; Zt ￿ Z
￿
t
3 Empirical corroboration of the model
In our fragility model, saving is the key element that connects the three features of political
stability and absence of violence, secure property rights and enforceable contracts, and absence
of corruption, with long-run economic growth. As a result, our empirical strategy will emphasize
the model￿ s implications for the growth rate of GDP per capita. (See equation (2.2.6) or equiva-
lently (2.2.7). The theoretical model identi￿es implications that are examined in our estimations.
The main prediction for capital accumulation from equation (2.2.7) are that physical capital in-
creases when (i) political stability, (1 ￿ ￿t); rises; (ii) corruption, dt; decreases, (iii) the tax rate
decreases; and (iv) property rights and contract enforcement, Gt improve: The most important
prediction of this model is that government investment in state capacity such as political stability,
17property rights and absence of corruption depends on its tax base, its ability to collect revenue,
and the level of external aid received. Furthermore, the model predicts that external aid a⁄ects
the growth rate of GDP per capita through its e⁄ects on political institutions and state capacity.
Empirical con￿rmation of these e⁄ects have important implications for aid policies towards fragile
countries.
3.1 Growth regressions
First, we assume that It is large relative to c; and kt > kL: Second, we apply a log transformation
on both sides of equation (2.3.4) to derive an empirical model that is used to test our fragility
hypothesis. 15
ln(Kt+1=Kt) = ￿0 + ￿1 lnGit + ￿2 ln(1 ￿ ￿it) + ￿3 ln(1 ￿ dit) + ￿4 ln(Iit=Yit) (3.1.1)
+￿5 lnZt + ￿6 ln(Tit=Yit) + ￿7 lnXit + "it;
where subscript i indicates country, and t indicates year. The dependent variable is ln(Kt+1=Kt);
and the independent variables are property rights, Git; political stability and absence of violence, (1￿
￿it); absence of corruption, (1 ￿ dit); investment ratio (to proxy the stock of physical capital),
(Iit=Yit); tax ratio, (Tit=Yit)); and various control variables. Because some of our variables contain
zero values, we keep all variables in level form; hence we test the following simple linear model:
(3.1.2) git = ￿0 + ￿1yt￿1 + ￿2(Iit=Yit) + ￿3(Tit=Yit) + ￿4Zt + ￿5(1 ￿ ￿it) + ￿6Xit + "it;
where one of the control variables is the initial GDP per capita (I_GDPpc), yt￿1.
We organize our data on growth rates and on the other variables for which measures are
available into six half-decade observation periods, for 1980-84, 1985-89, etc. The data span from
1980 through 2010 for about 120 countries. All data are from the World Bank (WDR 2011). In
all regressions, we use the growth rate of real GDP per capita as our dependent variable and a set
of independent variables in which we include initial GDP (IGDP), investment ratio (I/GDP), tax
ratio (T/GDP), total O¢ cial Development Aid (ODA), Political stability and absence of violence
(Polit. Stab.), Latitude, Latitude Square, and a set of dummies, including intercept and slope
15We assume that c is very small relative to It and can be droped from equation (2.3.4).
18dummy variables. Table 1 reports the OLS results of a panel data analysis of equation (3.1.1).
Table 1: OLS with robust standard errors

















































































































Note: Entries for variables in this table, and all susequent tables, are estimated coe¢ cients followed
by standard errors in parentheses, and *, ** & *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1%
levels respectively.
Turning to the estimates, we begin with OLS with robust standard errors as our baseline.
We ￿nd that all coe¢ cients on initial GDP per capita (I_GDPpc) are negative and statistically
signi￿cant at 10 percent only in speci￿cations where a dummy variable for fragility has been
included (See columns 2 and 4 of Table 1). The investment share of GDP (I/GDP) is highly
signi￿cant (p < 0:001) in all speci￿cations, with an average positive coe¢ cient of about 0.125.
We have two variables of interest in this study, namely political stability and absence of violence
19(Polit. Stab.) and O¢ cial Development Aid (ODA).
Table 2: Fixed e⁄ects (within) regressione with intercept dummies

















































































































Polit. Stab. has the predicted signs, but was never signi￿cant in any of the OLS speci￿cations,
maybe because of reverse causality or unobservable heterogeneity. ODA is statistically signi￿cant
at 5% in all speci￿cations, except column 5￿ s speci￿cation where the level of signi￿cance drops
to 10%. Unlike speci￿cations in columns 1-4, speci￿cation in column 5 includes dummies for
African fragile and non fragile states. In Tables 2 and 3 we use FE regression models to correct
for possible unobservable heterogeneity, while Table 4 and 5 use IV-2SLS models to address issues
of possible endogeneity.
Across all speci￿cations in Tables 2 & 3, I_GDPpc, I/GDP, and Tax rate are statistically
signi￿cant with the predicted signs. Coe¢ cients on ODA are positive and statistically signi￿cant
20at 5% in all speci￿cations, with considerable increases in Table 3￿ s coe¢ cients. For example, in
Table 2 where we use intercept dummy variables, a one unit increase in ODA leads to an average
of 0:0005 increase in GDPpc growth, while GDPpc growth increases by almost two-fold (about
0.0009) in Table 3 where slope-dummy variables are controlled for. Hence, consistent with our
model, increase in external aid is strongly associated with increase in the growth rate of GDP
per capita.
Turning to the impact of political stability, unlike Table 1, Tables 2 & 3 present much more
improved cases, with the coe¢ cient on Polit. Stab. increasing by 20% in Table 2 (see columns
1 & 3), and by 30% in all speci￿cations of Table 3. In both cases the signi￿cance level on Polit.
Stab is at 10%. However, when slope dummies involving ODA and African fragile and non fragile
states dummies are accounted for, Polit. Stab and ODA become insigni￿cant (See column 5, Table
3). Globally speaking, results in Table 2 & 3 suggest that a one-point increase in Polit. Stab.
will increase the growth rate of GDP per capita by about 0:35 to 0:41 points.
Controlling for fragile states in African countries provides additional insights about the link
between ODA and growth in African countries. To test our model that external aid has a di⁄erent
and independent impact on African fragile countries compared to the rest of the countries, we
create an intercept dummy variable ￿Dummy Africa Fragile￿ that takes the value of one for
African fragile countries and zero otherwise. We also create a slope dummy variable "ODA_Afr.
Fragile", which represents African Fragile countries times O¢ cial Development Aid. This variable
is used to determine whether the e⁄ect of ODA on growth di⁄ers between African fragile countries
and the rest of the countries, including African non fragile states.
As shown in Table 3, the statistical evidence supports the prediction of our fragility model.
First, the intercept dummy variable is negative and statistically signi￿cant. African fragile coun-
tries have lower growth rates. Second the interaction variable is positive and signi￿cant. ODA
has a positive impact on growth for African fragile countries. Third, once ODA_Afr_Fragile
(ODA for African frigile countries) is set apart, total ODA becomes insigni￿cant; implying that
all the signi￿cance power observed in this variable was simply driven by the fact that African
fragile countries were not controlled for in all speci￿cations but speci￿cation 5 of Table 3. Finally,
setting apart ODA-Afr_Fragile weakens the impact of political stability on growth to the point
21that it too becomes insigni￿cant.
Table 3: Fixed e⁄ects (within) regressions with slope dummies

























































































































To summarize, the most striking result is found in column 5 of Table 3; it indicates that
ODA does not exert an independent e⁄ect on growth once African fragile countries are properly
accounted for. In addition, Polit. Stab. ceases to exert an independent e⁄ect on growth once
African fragile countries are controlled for (column 5 of Table 3). This suggests that ODA has
a direct e⁄ect on growth as well as an indirect e⁄ect which runs through political stability.
However, all these results are based on the strong assumption that all regressors are exogenous.
22In the following section we check the robustness of our results against possible endogeneity of
some institutional variables like political instability and violence.
3.2 2SLS and IV regression
All the policy and institutional variables in (3.1.1) are endogenous to economic growth and
should receive appropriate treatment. These variables might provide new insights as regard to
the implications of our fragility model. One of the shortcoming of the methods used in the previous
section (OLS & FE) is that it fails to distinguish between variables that are clearly exogenous
and variables that may be endogenous. We follow the empirical growth literature and consider
that political instability and violence is endogenous to economic development. In this section
we estimate a set of two-stage least-squares regression models in which geographical (Latitude,
Tropical, Longitude, landlock) and historical (Legal_German, Legal_French) variables are used
as instruments to predict political instability and violence. We present results that are consistent
with tests for both endogeneity and over-identifying restrictions.
Tables 4 and 5 show second-stage regressions for political instability and violence. Each
speci￿cation, represented by a di⁄erent column in each Table is the growth equation that includes
the predicted value of political instability and violence. In each column we control for a di⁄erent
dummy or set of dummy variables to be able to assess the consistency and robustness of our
results. In particular Table 4 uses intercept dummy variables while Table 5 uses slope dummy
variables.
In Table 4 we estimate the same regression models as in Table 2, except that Table 4 controls
for the endogeneity of the institutional variable, Politic_Stab.16 Globally speaking, IV models
obtain much better results than simple FE models and con￿rm the impact of geographical and
historical factors on economic development through political instability (see also Cinyabuguma et
al., 2011). For example, in the IV models I_GDPpc increases by about 280%, Tax Rate by 20%,
while I/GDP decreases by 20% (all changes refer to coe¢ cients in absolute terms and compare
results from Table 3 and Table 4). In particular, ODA improves by about 30% while Polit. Stab.
16In the regressions for political stability and absence of violence (not shown in this paper, but available upon
request), both Landlock and Tropical obtain positive and statiscally signi￿cant coe¢ cients, with the expected signs.
Latitude and Latitude square, which cannot be excluded from any of the second-stage regressions, obtain positive
coe¢ cients on the square term and negative coe¢ cients on the level term, with the positive coe¢ cients becoming
dominant for high values of Latitude. This implies a positive relationship between latitude and political stability
for high values of Latitude. Legal_German, Legal_French, and Longitude all are insigni￿cant.
23increases by 360%. This suggests that our OLS/FE estimators are in fact inconsistent and biased.
Table 4: Second-stage regressions for IV models with intercept dummies














































































































































Note: Over-identifying restrictions are conducted through Sargan(￿2) and Basmann (￿2) tests, and
Endogeneity tests are conducted through W-H (F) test and DWH (￿2). DWH refers to Durbin￿ Wu
￿ Hausman ￿2￿test; and WH refers to Wu￿ Hausman F-test. Entries in parentheses are p-values.
List of Instrucments: Latitude, Latitude Sq, Legal_French, Legal_Geram, Tropical, Logitude, Landlock.
All ODA coe¢ cients remain statistically signi￿cant at 5% with the predicted signs and support
the intuition that external aid helps growth. However, unlike Table 2, Polit. Stab. is now
statistically signi￿cant at 5% in all speci￿cations with a strong positive e⁄ect on economic growth.
Accounting for various intercept dummies￿ including dummy for Africa, dummy for fragile states,
24dummy for African fragile states and dummy for African non fragile states￿ does not a⁄ect the
qualitative result on both ODA and political stability.17
In Table 5 we test the robustness of our conclusions from Table 3 regarding the e⁄ect of ODA
on growth in fragile African countries when IV models are used. We apply the same testing
strategy as for Table 3. Results from Table 4 indicated that adding intercept dummy variables
does not change our conclusions about the relationship between ODA, Polit. Stab. and growth.
Unlike Table 4, speci￿cations in Table 5 control for two types of dummy variables: intercept
dummy variables and slope dummy variables. In particular, speci￿cation in column 5 includes
both a dummy variable for African fragile countries and an interaction between ODA and a
dummy variable for African fragile countries (this is given by ODA_Afr_fragile) to determine
whether the e⁄ect of ODA on growth continues to di⁄er between African fragile countries and
the rest of the world, even after controlling for endogeneity of the institutional variable.
First, as shown in Table 5, the dummy variable for African fragile countries has a negative and
insigni￿cant direct e⁄ect on growth. However, the indirect e⁄ect, given through political stability,
is statistically signi￿cant with the predicted sign.18 This suggests that African fragile countries
are less stable, and hence have lower growth. Second, the interaction term (known as slope dummy
variable) is positive and statistically signi￿cant. It indicates that a one unit increase in ODA for
African fragile countries would increase growth by 0:002; this is indeed an indication that ODA
continues to exert an independent e⁄ect on growth in African fragile countries. Third, even when
the interaction term between ODA and a dummy for African fragile countries is controlled for,
total ODA continues to be statistically signi￿cant, but with a much smaller e⁄ect than before
(having both a smaller coe¢ cient and a lower signi￿cance level). Additionally, and ￿nally, when
African fragile countries are set apart, political stability displays the smallest coe¢ cient and drops
its signi￿cance power from 5% to 10%. The negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on
the interaction term between ODA and a dummy for African non fragile countries suggests that
17Most of these dummies exert indirect e⁄ects on growth through political stability and absence of violence. For
example, in a series of ￿rst stage regressions not shown in this paper we ￿nd that african fragile countries tend to
be more politically unstable, while african non fragile countries are more stable and at peace.
18This result was found in a ￿rst stage regression not shown in this paper but available upon request.
25aid￿ s productivity is mainly through fragile rather than non-fragile states.
Table 5: Second-stage regressions for IV models with slope dummies

























































































































































Note: Over-identifying restrictions are conducted through Sargan(￿2) and Basmann (￿2) tests, and
Endogeneity tests are conducted through W-H (F) test and DWH (￿2). DWH refers to Durbin￿ Wu
￿ Hausman ￿2￿test; and WH refers to Wu￿ Hausman F-test. Entries in parentheses are p-values.
List of Instrucments: Latitude, Latitude Sq, Legal_French, Legal_Geram, Tropical, Logitude, Landlock.
264 Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to explore whether the particular characteristics of Africa￿ s fragile
states￿ instability and violence, insecure property rights, and high levels of corruption￿ led them
to be caught in a low-growth equilibrium trap. Using an analytical model that captures the e⁄ect
of these features on savings, investment and economic growth, we showed that the economy had
two possible equilibria: one of sustained growth, and the other of continuous decline and eventual
collapse. Countries could escape the low-level equilibrium, or avoid falling into it, by addressing
the problems of instability, insecure property rights and corruption, but this requires resources.
And the problem facing many of Africa￿ s fragile states is that donors hold back external aid
precisely because these countries su⁄er from issues of corruption, violence and insecure property
rights. The analysis shows that the above issues may relegate these countries to remaining trapped
in a low-level equilibrium. Conversely, additional resources, provided they are used to tackle the
problems identi￿ed above, can help countries escape from the fragility trap.
Empirical results corroborate the model and its conclusions. First, a growth regression based
on the model and using a panel data set of all developing countries found the salient variables to
be statistically signi￿cant with the predicted sign. In particular, foreign aid is positively related
to economic growth. Next, we separated out Africa￿ s fragile states. We found that, not only do
these countries grow more slowly, but the e⁄ect of additional foreign aid is signi￿cantly higher. To
make these estimates closer to a complete test of the model, we take into account the endogeneity
of the policy variables, such as investments in improving stability and avoiding violence. Results
using instrumental variables (Tables 4 and 5) strongly support our model￿ s predictions.
Taken together, the analytical and empirical results lend support to the propositions of Collier,
Sachs, Zoellick and others, synthesized in the 2011 World Development Report, that fragile states
are qualitatively di⁄erent from non-fragile states. The di⁄erence is the possibility of falling into
a low-level equilibrium trap. The existence of this possibility, and these states￿proximity to the
￿tipping point￿ , has important implications for aid policies towards African fragile countries. If
aid can be used to help these countries escape the fragility trap, the bene￿ts of aid could be
enormous￿ and dwarf the usual considerations of low aid-productivity because of weak policies
and institutions. Con￿rmation of the importance of external aid suggests that studying its impact
at the sectoral level and looking at interactions among policies and institutions constitutes an
important direction for future research.
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